a natural manner which results in a solution of the compound game. B. Peleg gave a characterization of the kernel of another kind of composition for games ([10] ). The nucleolus of a compound game was characterized in [8] . The kernel of a product of simple games was characterized in [6] . This paper generalizes the results of [6] with respect to the kernel. (N; v) , where JV is a nonempty finite set (N = {1, , n}) and v is a real-valued function defined over the subsets of N. The elements of N are the players and the subsets of N are the coalitions.
2* Preliminaries* A characteristic function game is a pair Γ =
If for every coalition S either v(S) = 0 or v(S) -1 then we call the game a simple game. Those coalitions that have a unit value are called winning coalitions. The set of the winning coalitions is denoted by "W and the game is represented also by (N; W"). We always assume 0ί^" and Ne w: A game is said to be monotonic if for every pair of coalitions S, T.
(2.1) s a T => v(S) ^ v(T) .
A 1-normalized game is a game (N; v) such that (2.2) v(N) = 1 .
A 1-0-normalized game is a 1-normalized game (N; v) such that (2. 3) *({*}) = 0 (i = l, -.-,*).
We assume that always (2.4) 0(0) = 0 .
A player i e N is called dummy if for every coalition S (2.5) Φ(S U W) = v(S) .
Notice that if i is a dummy then according to (2.4) 
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Γ o is the quotient and Γ l9 •••, Γ m are the components. Thus, a coalition in the compound game has the value (in the quotient) of the set of those components in which it has enough players to form a winning coalition (in that game). The concept of a compound game contains as particular cases the product and the sum of simple games.
The product of two simple games Γ l9 Γ 2 is defined by (2.8) A (x) Γ 2 = B 2 [Γ U Γ 2 ] and their sum is defined by (2.9) ΛΘΛ = B? [A,Λ] where B 2 and B* are defined by (2.10) B 2 = ({1, 2}; {1, 2}) (2.11) Bί = ({1, 2}; {1}, {2}, {1, 2}) .
An imputation in an π-player game Γ = (N; v) in an w-tuple of real numbers x = (x ίf , x n ) such that (2.12) Xi^v({ί}) (i = l, ...,n) and (2.13) Σ a* = v(iV) .
The set of the imputations is denoted by <%f{Γ). A pseudo-imputation is an π-tuple of nonnegative numbers x = (a? lf ••-,»") that satisfies (2.13) . A wβα& imputation is defined by (2.12) and (2.14) Σ a* ^ *>(#)
The set of the weak imputations will be denoted by <%f(Γ). For every coalition S we denote
and call e(S, x) the excess of S with respect to x. The maximum surplus of a player i against another player j with respect to x is defined by (2.17) 8ii (x) = Max {β(S, a?): S c iV, i 6 S, j e S} .
The kernel (for the grand coalition) of a game Γ* = (N; v) is defined to be the set SΓ(Γ) of all the imputations x e <%f(Γ) such that for every pair of distinct players i, j e iV, α?, -> ^({i}) implies Equivalently, x belongs to the kernel of the game if and only if for every pair of distinct players i, j
The kernel is nonempty whenever <%f{Γ) is nonempty (see [2] ) and for monotonic games in 1-0-normalization (2.19) 
Proof. (i) If j is not a veto players in
(T) -μ(T\{k}): keTaM}-min {x(S): S e Max {u(T) -μ(T): k e T c M} -x { ]
Max {e°(Γ, μ):
(ii) If j is a veto player in Γ k then W~i) = 0 and
LEMMA 3.5. Let Γ = (N; v) be a compound game, let x and let i e N k , j e N t be two players belonging to distinct component
(ii) If j is a veto player in Γ t then
. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.4.
LEMMA 3.6. Let Γ -(N; v) be a compound game and let x e J%^(Γ). For every k
Assume that x(N k ) > 0 and let j e N k such that x s > 0. j& S o and therefore j is not a veto player. Let i e S o . According to Lemma 3.4,
It follows that s {j (x) > s H (x) in contradiction to our assumption that x e 3f(Γ).
The other direction of (3.21) is immediate. , ra,
Proof. If μ h = 0 then for every TaM
Suppose μ k > 0 and let ie N k such that a?< > 0 and
Thus,
If i is not a veto player in Γ fc then
In this case it follows from Lemma 3.2 and (3.29)-(3.30) that
and this is equivalent to (3.25) . If i is a veto player then
In this case (3.31) follows from Lemma 3.2, (3.29) , and (3.32).
REMARK 3.8. If i is a veto player in Γ k then it follows from Lemma 3.2, (3.29), and (3.32) that (3.33) gl(μ) = h\(μ) .
4* On the kernel of a component game* The barycentric projection of an imputation x e <£f(Γ) on a coalition S such that x(S) > 0 will be denoted (see [13; p. 6 
Proof. The kernel of a simple game with veto players consists of a unique point in which the veto players share equally while the others get zero ([5; Theorem 4.1] ).
(a) Suppose B N} x e St~(Γ k ) and let i, j be two distinct players in Γ k . If both of them are veto players then (see Lemma 3.4)
and since x i -x 3 it follows that s i3 {x) = s 3i (x) . If j is a veto player but i is not, then (notice that Si 3 (x) = s k (x) since all the winning coalitions in Γ k have the same excess 1 -x{N k ))
According to (4.5) (it holds when i is not a veto player) and the fact that Xi = 0, it follows that
Considering (4.2) it follows that s i3 (x) ^ s 3i (x).
If j is not a veto player 
and hence
This means that j belongs to every winning coalition having a maximal excess ((4.10) holds for each veto player ϊ). Thus, a coalition S that has a maximal excess contains all the veto players and all the other players of positive payoff. Therefore,
It follows that all the winning coalitions have the same excess in contradiction to (4.10) . This contradiction proves that each player j who is not a veto player gets zero and therefore B Nk x belongs to the kernel. 1 .
x(N k )
It follows from (4.2) (note that s(x) = s°(μ)) that (4.17) Δ, 1^0. Using Lemma 3.4 we find that (4 18)
and it follows that
Suppose (4.13) is satisfied for every pair of distinct players i,jeN k . We will show that for every j e N k (j is not a veto player) 
it follows that Analogously,
It follows from (4.17), (4.19) , and (4.27)-(4.28) that In a similar way we can show that (4.28) holds. (4.13) follows from (4.17), (4.19) , (4.28) , and (4.30).
5* The dependence on the quotient game* In the preceding section we proved that the barycentric projection of a point in the compound kernel on any component must belong to the kernel of that component (or to the pseudo-kernel if (3.1) is not satisfied in the com-ponent game). Moreover, if the barycentric projection of an imputation in the compound game is in the kernel of the component then the imputation must satisfy the kernel condition ((2.21)) for every pair of distinct players in that component. To complete the characterization of the kernel of the compound game we have to show how the components' kernels should be composed in order to obtain the compound kernel.
The compound kernel depends on the quotient game by means of a subset of its imputations space which is defined as follows. DEFINITION 
Let Γ = (M; u) be a monotonic m-player game. Let w -(w ly •••, w m ) be an m-twple of nonnegative numbers. The [weak] w-equalizing set [3^W{Γ)]^W{Γ) of Γ is defined to be the set of all the [weak] imputations [y e <^(Γ)] y e <%?{Γ) that satisfy the following three conditions: ( i) For each i, i = 1, -, m, (5.1) Λ (») = s(y) . (ii) For every pair of distinct players i, j e M, if w { = 0 and Wj > 0 then (5.2) s iά {y) = s(y) .
(iii) For every pair of distinct players i, j e M, if both w t > 0 and Wj
> 0 then (5.3) Max \ 8ij (y), a^y) --M = Max \ 8ji (y) f a iά {y) -Jk-1 .
. ^W(Γ)[^W(Γ)]
is a finite union of convex polytopes. The number of linear inequalities which determine the ^-equalizing set is of the same order of magnitude of that number in the kernel. When most of the w r s are zeroes this number is smaller than the respective number in the kernel. The computation of έ^w(Γ) can be carried out according to [1] . We conjecture that an algorithm based on the "profile" idea can be built for ^W(Γ) (see [3, 4] ).
The ^-equalizing set of a simple game is sufficient for determining the weak ^-equalizing set of that game: LEMMA The ^-equalizing set will be now used to characterize the dependence of the compound kernel of the quotient game. (b) We prove the necessity of condition (ii). Assume that w k = 0 and w t > 0, 1 ^ k < I <; m. Let ie N k and let jeNi be a veto player in Γ t . Since x k e JT"(Λ) and x ι e JT~(Λ), it follows from (5.12) and Lemma 3.5 that
If Γ -(M; ^) is a monotonic simple game without
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(5.13) 8ii (x) -Max [sUμ),
aUμ) -x t ] and
Note that (5.13)-(5.14) hold even if x £ 3T{Γ) and (5.14) is independent of j being a veto player. If x e SΓ(Γ) it follows from condition (i) (we have proved its necessity) and (5.14) that .21) x. = iί*.; χ, = J±-.
W k Wι
Lemma 3.5 and (5.12) imply
and, symmetrically,
The last two equalities are independent of x belonging to the kernel. 
Proof. Suppose xe<5Γ(Γ).
For every keM such that The minimum payoff to a winning coalition is positive for every point in the kernel of a simple game (see [6; Lemma 3.7] ). Thus, μ k [x k *] > 0 and
The normalization assumption may be dropped and the theorem is true for the pseudo-kernel instead of the kernel (see Lemma 5.6).
According to (6.1) (6.4) χ = ±J^χ»
and that proves that j^f(Γ) is obtained in the right-hand side of (6.2) . Let x belong to the right-hand side of (6.2 To complete the proof of the present theorem, notice that instead of ^™(Γ 0 ). Moreover, instead of intersecting with £?(Γ) in the right-hand side of (6.6), we can obtain exact imputations by normalization, i.e., by defining , Γ m ] can be computed according to Theorem 6.4 . Given the kernels of the components, the kernel of the product is very easy to compute (see [6; Theorem 3.1] ). The set of vertices of a polyhedron in the kernel of a product is the union of sets of vertices of polyhedra in the kernels of the components. 7 Kernels of compound majority games* A majority game is an w-player simple game M n>k in which a coalition wins if and only if it consists of at least k players. In this section we apply the results of the preceding one to games of the form 
Under these conditions if S, Te^ and i,je(S\J T)\(S Π T) then
Proof. Assume i e S\T and j e T\S. Thus, If i, jeS\T let I e T\S (if S 3 T then, clearly, x i = x ά = 0) and according to what we have proved in (7.4) and (7.5) x t = x t = x 3 -.
